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Hofstra Law Review “Ideas” Symposium Draft – October 8, 2011

INTRODUCTION:
THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION
Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott*
The Hofstra Law Review has organized an “Ideas” symposium around our book
manuscript “The Three and a Half Minute Transaction”. The idea for this
symposium came from a debate that occurred at a faculty workshop at the Hofstra
Law School some months ago where we were presenting our book manuscript. The
topics of conversation included the following: the future of the current big-law-firm
model, what value lawyers add in commercial transactions that use boilerplate
contracts, why (and whether) boilerplate contracts are so slow to change, why law
firms do not generally have R&D departments, the resolution of the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis and more. The Essays in this symposium are from an
exceptional group of scholars and practitioners and we are honored that they use
our manuscript as their jumping off point to tackle some of the topics mentioned.
What we provide here is a brief introduction to the manuscript itself.

*
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THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design
Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott†

INTRODUCTION
Last fall we gave a faculty workshop at the Hofstra Law School on an early
version of our book manuscript, “The Three and a Half Minute Transaction.” The
resulting debate was heated and the discussion ranged over a wide variety of topics. The
end result, much to our delight, was that the editors of the Hofstra Law Review suggested
an “ideas symposium” where they would invite a group of eminent scholars and
practitioners to react to the manuscript. The hope was that those reactions would
generate a further debate akin to the one we had had at the workshop. Given the
exceptional group of scholars and experts in the field that the editors of the Hofstra Law
Review have assembled, they have clearly achieved their goal. And we are pleased that
they asked us also to contribute a short introduction to their Ideas symposium that would
provide readers with some background on the book manuscript.
The story in the book begins with what, by all rights, should have been a minor
legal skirmish. It took place roughly a decade ago, in September 2000, in an obscure
commercial court in Brussels. A U.S. hedge fund, Elliott Associates, was attempting to
recover on debt on which the Republic of Peru had defaulted some years prior during the
Latin American Debt crisis. Elliott, a so-called “vulture fund,” specialized in buying
unpaid debt obligations on the secondary markets at a deep discount and then seeking to
recover in full by using innovative litigation techniques devised by a crack team of
lawyers (backed by private investigators and investment specialists). For over a hundred
years, creditors had found it nearly impossible to successfully sue a sovereign state for
unpaid debt obligations. Elliott Associates was attempting to change the traditional rules
of the game. In September 2000 in Brussels they succeeded in doing precisely that.
†
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Given the difficulties associated with trying to sue and recover directly from a
sovereign, Elliott was attempting instead to pursue the financial intermediary that Peru
was using to pay those creditors who had entered into its officially sanctioned
restructuring agreement (holders of “Brady bonds”). If asked about Elliott’s chances of
success at the time, most sophisticated observers would likely have put them at close to
zero. But, a combination of unusual events, including a court that was unfamiliar with
sovereign litigation and sovereign debt contracts, a brewing corruption scandal involving
the Peruvian president, and Elliott finding a contract provision whose meaning no one
else seemed to know, combined to result in a victory for Elliott. In the end, this ex parte
ruling became one of the most momentous decisions in global finance. Our book is about
the impact of that case, and, in particular, what did and did not happen in the decade
following.
At the center of the case, was the interpretation of a three-line clause – the pari
passu clause (which mean, literally, “in equal step”) -- that has been in cross-border
financial contracts for at least a century. One might imagine that a clause of this vintage,
one that is found in practically every modern cross-border sovereign bond issuance,
would be among the most well understood of the boilerplate terms that are part of the
modern sovereign debt contract. Yet, this was a provision that almost no one understood:
In essence, pari passu was a boilerplate contract provision that most parties treated
merely as ornamentation. All that changed, however, when the local commercial court in
Brussels issued a preliminary injunction based on Elliot’s interpretation of the clause as
an inter-creditor agreement to share equally in any payments by the sovereign to its
unsecured creditors. That interpretation resulted in Elliott recovering somewhere in the
vicinity of $55 million on a debt claim that it had purchased for around $11 million.
Industry elders were apoplectic at the outrageousness of the decision. But more
importantly all the industry players were unanimous in their view that, whatever pari
passu meant, it was not a term that required creditors who had consented to a
restructuring agreement to share their payments with non-consenting creditors. Such an
interpretation would essentially permit any hold out creditor to disrupt restructuring
agreements in the future.

In view of what was supposedly a clearly erroneous interpretation, one might
have expected the elite practicing bar to have reacted immediately and decisively. Theory
tells us that they would have quickly clarified their forms so as to discredit the heretical
interpretation of this boilerplate provision before the heresy could spread and gain
traction. That didn’t happen. Ten years later, almost all sovereign debt contracts still
have this contract provision, often on the front page of the sales document, and
essentially unchanged in form and language from the clause that was the subject of
litigation in Brussels.
In our book, we attempt to unpack the puzzle of why these financial contracts
were not revised despite the on-going risk of other courts or adjudicative bodies adopting
the same destabilizing interpretation. But we also tell a story of forgetfulness. It is a
story of how a remarkably unconfiding contractual provision was introduced into
international financial contracts over a hundred years ago, got absorbed into the lumpish
boilerplate of such contracts, and then came to be replicated, thousands upon thousands
of times, even while the knowledge of its origin and purpose insensibly faded from the
minds of its remote drafters. If anything, the increase in the popularity of this clause in
international financial contracts seems to have been inversely related to market
understandings of its meaning. As the clause became more widely used over the past
century, shared understanding of its intended meaning actually diminished.
This is also a story about the organic life form known as a standard commercial
contract and about how such documents pass relatively untouched through the hands of
generations of lawyers much like a seed can pass unharmed through the intestinal tract of
a bird. The story can be told from the standpoint of basic human psychology; novelty
sparks curiosity, repetition stupefies it. Or it can be told from the perspective of a legal
profession in which new lawyers are expected to learn the lore of their craft from their
elders in a tutorial, master/apprentice system that no longer exists in most major law
firms. Or the tale can be brought down to the individual lawyer working on a financial
document late at night, and who briefly wonders about the significance of a pari passu
representation in her agreement, only to pass on, comforted by the thought that someone

at the firm must know why it is there; the document is, after all, the firm’s standard form
for this type of deal.
Finally there is the question: If the pari passu clause could have lain dormant,
unchallenged for over a century in cross-border financial contracts, how many other
boilerplate clauses might similarly have outlived the memory of their origins and
purpose, making them prime candidates for creative interpretations by highly motivated
litigants?
Conventional wisdom in the world of contract theory is that sophisticated lawyers,
especially those who get paid large amounts of money to service clients in the financial
sector, are fast moving, innovating and quick to fix any problems that their clients might
encounter. If a court makes an error of interpretation, according to this story, lawyers
will soon respond by revising their contracts to make sure that the problem does not
occur again. Yet numerous scholars over the years have observed that reality does not
match theory. Financial contracts, in even the most sophisticated sectors, are often very
slow to change (“Sticky”, in the parlance of the trade). But why? Both the academic
literature and the lore of practicing lawyers have posited theories. But scholars have had
little success in pinning down an answer.
The pari passu case from Brussels interested us because it had the potential to
unlock a mystery that had long bothered legal scholars in the financial contracts field.
Why was it that these sophisticated and highly paid lawyers, working at the most elite
firms in the world, failed to alter a contract term that not only posed a litigation risk to
their clients, but that no one understood.
The failure to revise a contract term that, owing to an aberrant interpretation, now
carried a non-trivial litigation risk was completely inconsistent both with the theoretical
models of how sophisticated contract drafters behaved and with the dynamic model of
case law serving as the basis for contract drafting and innovation. We assumed there had
to be a rational explanation for the fact that “the dog didn’t bark.” Our speculation was
that we would find some form of “agency problem” driving the phenomenon: lawyers
were failing to represent their clients’ interests adequately owing to recognizable

conflicts of interest. Perhaps, for example, lawyers were reluctant to admit that they had
failed on past deals to exert appropriate efforts on behalf of the clients to remove the
litigation risk that ultimately materialized. Whether owing to this or other causes, we
believed that we would be able to solve the puzzle quickly. Surely, it would only take a
few months to find the answers to our questions and to publish the results in a short
article.
We began by gathering information along two different dimensions. First, we
collected data on the contracts themselves – to see whether what we had perceived by
casual observation (that the contract provisions had not been revised to fix the offending
provision) was actually the case for a large dataset. Second, we asked a sample of the
senior New York lawyers who worked on sovereign debt contracts whether we could
speak to them about our puzzle. In our original research plan, we proposed to interview
25-30 lawyers in New York and to examine 50-75 sovereign debt contracts over the
period 2000-2005.
Our early optimism about finding an answer turned out to be misplaced. No
coherent answers could be gleaned from either the first set of contracts or the interviews.
Instead of a straight-forward agency problem or other market failure explanation, these
hard-nosed Wall Street lawyers told us stories about rituals, talismans, alchemy, the
search for the Holy Grail, and Zeus. Frustrated, we assumed that we simply had not
talked to enough people or the right people or looked at enough sovereign debt contracts.
As we write this Essay, more than six years after we began, we have examined over
1,500 sovereign debt contracts, covering the period 1820-2010 and conducted more than
200 interviews. As we kept unpacking the story, it became more fascinating even as a
straightforward conflict of interest hypothesis proved ever more elusive. No single
agency cost explanation emerged from the data; at least not in a fashion that we could
assert with confidence. To be sure, we recognized that the lawyers we talked to would be
unselfconscious about the array of possible conflicts that might explain the failure to
amend or eliminate a troublesome clause, and also would be quite ignorant of any
theoretical explanations for the faithlessness of agents. Nevertheless, the explanations we
were given for why a troublesome clause was allowed to remain in subsequent contracts

were both diverse and conflicting. Moreover, we determined from our research that these
explanations often rested on myths that were based on quite unsupportable factual
premises.
Over time, a messy but more consistent hypothesis began to emerge: there
are many overlapping sources of agency costs in contemporary big firm law
practice--at least law practice of the sort represented by the firms that draft these
contracts and thus have had to grapple with the pari passu issue. The myths that we
were told can be best understood as ways in which the lawyers were able to deflect
what would otherwise be obvious failures to correct errors in the formulation of
historic boilerplate. “Three and a half minutes” is one explanation that was candidly
offered to us by a lawyer who sought to explain the trade off between the time it
took to “draft a new contract” and the effort costs of redesigning boilerplate that
was widely used and had been part of the standard form contract for many years.
But “three and a half minutes” is also a metaphor for a business model that relies on
herd behavior, fails to provide incentives for innovation and thus rises and falls on
volume-based, cookie-cutter transactions. To be sure, we find that in cases where
the litigation risk is perceived as acute, firms adapted to the risk by redesigning
sovereign debt contracts (often by adding new terms rather than correcting errors
in existing terms). But our evidence suggests that where the risk is real but not
acute, lawyers rely on the herd and on their myths: the returns to the firm in terms
of volume transactions outweigh the present value of the risk to them. This is
despite the fact that a social planner seeking to maximize the joint interests of
lawyers and their clients would likely choose a different business model. In short,
we conclude that social welfare is less than it would be under a different regime
even though the private benefits of volume transactions over careful design may
explain the firm behavior that we see.
The contributors to the “ideas symposium” come from a range of
perspectives. And those perspectives have helped push the ideas in our manuscript

well beyond our starting point. It goes without saying that we are deeply grateful to
both them and the editors of the Hofstra Law Review.
The essays in this symposium divide into two sets. The first set of essays
takes an institutional perspective. The focus is on the modern law firm and why its
contract production model may be malfunctioning. The second group of essays is
from scholars and practitioners more interested in the sovereign debt markets
themselves. These pieces, unsurprisingly, focus on the implications of our findings
for that market that, even as we write this, is facing one of its worse crises ever in
the Eurozone.
The Institutional Perspective
Stewart Macaulay and Preston Torbert, a legendary scholar and an eminent
practitioner, while coming at our manuscript from different directions, end up
asking very similar questions. This is perhaps not surprising, since Macaulay and
Preston are both interested in the nitty gritty of how contracts are produced at the
ground level and what function they serve, according to those who are producing and
using them. The “three and a half minute” model of contract production, under
current fee structures, is surely not sustainable, both of them seem to suggest,
independently. If eminent law firms are doing little more than reproducing contract
documents from prior deals, without doing much to correct errors in prior drafts, let
alone innovating and improving contracts, then it will not be long before boilerplate
contract drafting gets outsourced. One does not, after all, need to pay Wall Street
lawyer fees to have some junior associate cut and paste a document from a prior
deal. That process can occur at a significantly lower cost in Bangalore or Manila,
with what will probably be a higher rate of error correction. Perhaps the future of
the elite U.S. or U.K. law firm is less leverage, higher quality and greater outsourcing
of routine tasks.
Larry Ribstein, while also interested in the future of the law firm model, asks
the question of why firms innovate so little. In theory, after all, law firms should
want to do more (more work means higher billings, and that is what law firms want).

If lawyers are choosing not do certain types of work, therefore, there must be some
structural feature of the market that is deterring them from doing this work. Among
those structural features is the difficulty that lawyers have in capturing the returns
from innovations, particularly contract innovations. There are also other structural
features of law firms that deter innovation, such as the financing model that U.S. law
firms are forced to use, which is one where equity ownership by outsiders is not
permitted. This type of model deters long-term R&D development, Ribstein
suggests.
Of the four institutional voices, Barak Richman is perhaps the most optimistic
about the modern law firm. His criticism is reserved for what he sees as an
antiquated model that contract scholars use to understand the production of
boilerplate contracts. Contract production in the modern law firm, according to
Richman, is akin to the assembly-line production of a car in Detroit. It is mass
production, not Savile Row tailoring. The traditional principal-agent model where a
lawyer is crafting solutions for an individual client simply does not apply in the
context of boilerplate financial instruments. Precisely because boilerplate contracts
are mass produced (hence, “three and a half minutes”), they are necessarily going to
fail specific client needs. The model to apply, if one wants to understand modern
contract production, should be one taken from organizational economics, Richman
suggests.
The last four essays are by scholars and practitioners more grounded in the
sovereign debt market itself.
The Sovereign Debt Perspective
Mark Wright, one of the best-known economists writing about sovereign
debt today, makes at least two significant points in his piece. First, he suggests that
the fact that lawyers have been unwilling to alter the pari passu terms may mean
that they and their clients prefer the existing formulation. They may not have
appreciated the outcome in the Brussels case, where Elliott obtained a

disproportionate recovery, but that, according to Wright, does nothing to
undermine their preference for a rule mandating pari passu treatment. Put
differently, the actions of the lawyers in retaining the clause are a better indicator of
true preferences of market actors than their rhetoric. Second, Wright asks whether,
as an independent matter, it really is so outrageous for creditors to ask for a clause
that both promises them equal treatment vis-à-vis other unsecured creditors and
also allows them a meaningful remedy if those rights are not respected. Wright is
asking exactly the right questions, we think. In terms of the first point, it was the
disjunction between what lawyers were saying (that the Brussels interpretation of
pari passu was outrageous) and what they were doing (failing to alter the pari passu
clauses in their own contracts to negate the outrageous interpretation) that
interested us in the first place. The second point also raises interesting issues.
What we see as a result of the Brussels case is that sovereign contracts can, in fact,
be designed in ways that make it possible to sue and enforce against the sovereign.
Contract lawyers, one might think, would take the Brussels case and the success of
Elliott as an impetus to design better mechanisms to enable enforcement against
misbehaving sovereign debtors. After all, ex ante, that should produce a lower cost
of capital. But this does not seem to be happening at all.
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Robert Cohen, an eminent scholar and
practitioner, respectively, take up positions as opposite ends of the spectrum in
terms of the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments.
Olivares-Caminal, formerly the UNCTAD expert on sovereign debt, takes the official
position of condemning the interpretation given in Brussels. Cohen, one of the
primary lawyers for Elliott in the pari passu litigation, reiterates the basic point that
his clients have made repeatedly. If pari passu does not mean pro rata payment in
the sovereign context, what else can it possibly mean?
Finally, we have an article by one of the most eminent voices in the sovereign
debt world, Philip Wood. Wood doesn’t rehash the arguments over what pari passu
means in the sovereign context. Instead, his interest is in the broader notion of pari

passu promises and how, even in the non-sovereign context, this notion is confusing
and often violated. Contracting parties seem to want the symbolism that comes
with a promise of pari passu treatment, even when they do not wish to have it
operate as a strict contractual provision. And that, of course, begs the question of
why the notion of pari passu treatment shows up so often in both contracts and
statutes.
We are delighted that these eminent scholars and practitioners have engaged
our manuscript with such care and attention. They have surely moved the
discussion far beyond what we envisioned originally. Our thanks also to Allana
Grinshteyn and her fellow editors at the Hofstra Law Review for having worked
tirelessly in identifying and persuading the participants in this volume to contribute
their thoughts and in putting these diverse perspectives all together.

